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Abstract—In this work we describe the PriSM framework for
decentralized deployment of a federation of autonomous social
networks (ASN). The individual ASNs are centrally managed
by organizations according to their institutional needs, while
cross-ASN interactions are facilitated subject to security and
confidentiality requirements specified by administrators and
users of the ASNs. Such decentralized deployment, possibly either
on private or public clouds, provides control and ownership
of information/flow to individual organizations. Lack of such
complete control (if third party online social networking services
like Facebook or Yammer were to be used) has so far been a
great barrier in taking full advantage of the novel communication
mechanisms at workplace that have however become common-
place for personal usage with the advent of Web 2.0 platforms
and online social networks. PriSM provides a practical solution
for organizations to harness the advantages of online social
networking both in intra/inter-organizational settings, without
sacrificing individual as well as organizational autonomy, security
and confidentiality needs.
Index Terms—online social networking platform; decentraliza-
tion; federation; autonomy; private/public cloud; workplace
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networking and other Web 2.0 applications
have brought in a paradigm shift in the manner in which people
communicate and interact online. Realizing the versatility,
flexibility and reach of open online social networks such as
Facebook and Twitter, they have been widely embraced by
organizations for public relations as well as marketing and
monitoring purposes. Some relevant Web 2.0 technologies,
such as Wikis are also readily deployed within corporate
Intranets. However, other platforms, particularly social net-
working, despite its preponderance in the Internet setting, are
yet to become an integral part of individual organizations’
internal communication and workflow infrastructure.
While the new modes and (more importantly) opportunities
of interaction that social networking platforms provide can
significantly help improve an organization’s internal dynamics,
there have so far been several barriers in wide-scale adaption
of such infrastructure in workplace. Foremost, a Facebook
like platform which is open to all, or even a more closed
system like Yammer, hosted and controlled by a third party,
is unsuitable for storing and communicating sensitive business
data and information. In contrast to Wiki-engines which can
be privately deployed, there has been a relative lack of out-of-
the-box social networking platform software.1 Furthermore,
each organization is differently structured, and carries out
distinct activities, thus it is essential to be able to map
these organizational structures and processes in the platform.
Ultimately, even if most of the interactions are carried out
within corporate boundaries, ability to interact with outside
entities, for example, with customers or suppliers (or even
across different departments or project groups within same
organization), requires mechanisms enabling easy and flexible
ways to express rules of engagements and enforce and monitor
the same subject to various security and confidentiality needs
of all the stake-holders — particularly that of the organizations
and the individuals.
In this paper we present a framework for deploying au-
tonomous social networks (ASNs) that can be run and admin-
istered independently, and can further be federated with other
ASNs through trusted peering links. PriSM (Private Social
Mesh) implements such a framework. This results in a hybrid
architecture, where individual ASNs follow traditional OSN’s
client-server model, while the federation is achieved in a peer-
to-peer manner.
An analogy for such decentralized social networking plat-
form deployment may readily be drawn from the way ‘emails’
work. Individual organizations often choose to run their own
private email servers catering to their users, while these users
can also communicate with users using other email services.
Furthermore, organizations may also choose to rent the server
functionalities or even the whole email service from a cloud
based service provider. Our PriSM implementation allows
similar deployment models, i.e. deployed from scratch on
personal servers/private clouds or on a public cloud service
providing Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), or alternatively,
get administrative access to a preinstalled configurable in-
stance, akin to Software as a Service (SaaS). However, in con-
trast to email’s any-to-any communication paradigm, PriSM
allows ASN administrators as well as an user’s superiors from
within the organizational hierarchy to determine intra/inter
ASN communication restrictions. Thus, from an operational
point of view, PriSM provides bottom up access control where
1We note that recent implementations arising from works on decentralized
online social networks are partially filling up the void.
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individuals determine which other users have access to specific
resources owned by that user, as in traditional online social
networks, but it also allows top-down access control, where
(sub-)domain administrators/delegates determine the rights and
rules determining the possible actions that individuals can
carry out. From an infrastructural perspective, PriSM makes
similar trust assumptions as typical email server deployments,
and each organization (administrators) orchestrates the data
storage and flow within individual ASNs.
The main contributions of this work are as follows: (i)
A framework for decentralized deployment of autonomous
social networks (ASNs) which allow their users to map their
respective organizational structures and processes such as
departments, project (sub-)groups, etc. is proposed. (ii) The
proposed framework supports federation of ASNs with peering
mechanisms for inter-ASN user interactions. (iii) It allows
to scope intra/inter-ASN interactions flexibly, determined by
users (and their superiors) subject to business as well as
individual privacy and confidentiality needs. Furthermore, the
decentralized architecture naturally allows for deployment of
individual ASNs in both private/public server/cloud environ-
ments.
The rest of the paper describes the model and implementa-
tion of the PriSM framework as follows: Section II describes
the network model while Section III describe the “frontier”
information propagation & control mechanism. In Section IV
we present the access control mechanism deployed in PriSM
and Section V presents the architecture of the framework
detailing encountered implementation issues and summarizing
lessons learnt from the experience. Relevant related works are
discussed in Section VI. We draw our conclusions and outline
our ongoing and planned extensions of PriSM in Section VII.
II. THE SOCIAL MESH MODEL
We define a social mesh as a network of social networks, de-
scribed next by borrowing some terminologies from sociology
literature [1]. Naturally, the model is rather standard besides
the different user groups required by PriSM’s model. Note
that in what follows, we assume that a user is employed only
in a single organization. Hence, in our model, an individual
with multiple accounts across different ASNs is considered as
distinct users.
Figure 1 shows a simple example instance of a Social Mesh.
As briefly mentioned in Section I, PriSM models what we
call a Social Mesh, which is a network interconnecting distinct
Autonomous Social Networks (or ASN for short).
Definition 2.1 (Social Mesh): A Social Mesh SM is a tuple
〈ASN ,U ,PG〉
where ASN is the set of autonomous social networks and U
is the set of users. Each user u ∈ U belongs to exactly one
autonomous social netowk asn ∈ ASN . Finally, PG is the
set of public groups defined in SM .
An ASN is the social network defined within a given
organization. Thus, it defines the members, their privileges
and the communication channels which are existing within
Fig. 1: The social mesh model.
the organization. The ASN also enforces the organization’s
policies in terms of information flow, beside the users’ ones.
Definition 2.2 (Autonomous Social Network): Given a so-
cial mesh SM , an autonomous social network asn ∈
ASN (SM) is a tuple of the form
〈a,UD,SD, rsd,R〉
where UD ⊂ U(SM) is the set of users of asn and a ∈ UD is
the administrator of the autonomous social network. Moreover,
SD is the set of subdomains defined in asn, rsd ∈ SD is the
main subdomain and R is the set of roles defined in asn.
The information flow across different users of an ASN and
across different ASNs is managed by means of circles. A circle
is a group of users of the social mesh and an associated set of
rules controlling how information – messages – associated to
such circle can be accessed by users not belonging to the circle
itself. Thus, we assume that, in general, information associated
to a circle are accessible by members of the circle. In PriSM,
one may associate different circles to a message by means
of so called tag set (denoted by T (m)2), which is the set of
circles controlling who is entitled to access the message, and
a conflict set (denoted by I(m)), which is the set of circles
whose members cannot access the message.
PriSM allows the specification of different types of circles
to represent the different types of users’ groups existing within
real world organizations. Because of that, we need circles rep-
resenting both the internal structure of complex organizations,
as well as other circles not directly mapping formal structure
of an organization. We call circles materializing structures of
an organization as subdomains.
Definition 2.3 (Subdomain): Given a social mesh SM and
an autonomous social network asn ∈ ASN (SM), a subdo-
main sd ∈ SD(asn) is a tuple of the form
〈n,M,PR,P, a, f〉
where n is the identifier of the subdomain,M⊆ UD(asn) is
the set of members of sd, PR is the set of privileges granted
2We use the notation P (O) to refer to the property P of the object O
by the administrator to the members of the subdomain sd, P
is the set of rules defining the constraints a user must satisfy
in order to access messages tagged with sd (or any circle
which is a child of sd, see Definition 2.4, Definition 2.7 and
Definition 2.9) and a ∈M(sd) is the administrator of sd.
More than one user may have administrative privileges on a
given subdomain sd, as we discuss in Section IV. a(sd) is
the user who initially received the charge of managing sd.
We assume that a(sd) does not change over time even if
administrative privileges may be granted and revoked to other
users. Thus, we assume that a(sd) will always be granted
administrative privileges over sd.
Example of subdomains may be departments of a university
or branches of a company. Subdomains are organized in a
hierarchy representing the parent-child relationship existing
among the different departments of the company. PriSM does
not restrict the number of children of a subdomain, on the other
hand, we restrict the number of father of a subdomain to at
most one. Similarly, we will later assume similar restrictions
to circles. The reason is related to how PriSM’s information
propagation mechanism works, see Section III.
Definition 2.4 (Subdomain hierarchy): Let SD be the set of
subdomains defined for an autonomous social network asn.
The subdomain hierarchy
φSD : SD → SD ∪ {⊥}
is the function defining the hierarchy among the subdomains.
The root of the subdomains’ hierarchy is called main
subdomain. Such subdomain represents the organization itself.
Therefore, it is required to be defined and unique.
Definition 2.5 (Main subdomain): Given a set of subdo-
mains SD for a given autonomous social network asn we
define as main subdomain for asn the subdomain msd ∈ SD
such that φSD(msd) = ⊥. We further assume that msd exists
and is unique for each asn, which means that ∀sd ∈ SD if
φSD(sd) = ⊥ then sd = msd.
On the other hand, circles representing groups created
for official purposes, but without a direct mapping into the
organization’s structure, are called public groups.
Definition 2.6 (Public Group): Given a social mesh SM , a
public group PG ∈ PG(SM) is a tuple of the form
〈o,M,B,P〉
where o ∈ U is the user who created the public group,M⊆ U
is the set of users who are member of c. B ⊆ M is the set
of “bosses” of c, i.e. the users who can modify P , the set of
rules associated to the public group.
As an example, a public group may be a team of physicians
and nurses working on a specific disease. The different cases
related to that disease may be handled by users belonging
to different departments of the hospital, such as users from
the Cardiology Department (a subdomain) and users from
the Elderly Service Department (another subdomain). Hence,
the main feature characterizing a public group is the purpose
for which it has been created. Some ASNs may allow users
to create and join public groups created for purposes not
directly work-related, such as a group created to simplify the
communication among the players of the Nurse’s Soccer Team.
As opposed to subdomains, members of a public group may
belong to different ASNs, such as a research project carried
out by researchers and professors from different universities.
Similarly to subdomains, public groups may be organized
hierarchically. More precisely, in PriSM, a public group may
specify a public group or a subdomain as parent.
Definition 2.7 (Public Group hierarchy): Let PG be the set
of public groups and let SD be the set of subdomains of a
social mesh SM . The public group hierarchy
φPG : PG → PG ∪ SD ∪ {⊥}
is the function defining the parent-child relationship for public
groups.
Finally, PriSM allows users to define personalized circles
called private groups in which users are categorized according
to the preferences of the creator of the circle.
Definition 2.8 (Private Group): Given a user u, a private
circle prg ∈ PRG(u) is a couple of the form
〈M,P〉
where M⊆ U is the set of users who are member of prg. P
is the set of rules associated to the private group.
Again, private groups can be organized hierarchycally but
only among private groups of the same creator.
Definition 2.9 (Private Group hierarchy): Let PRG(u) be
the set of private gropus for a given user u. The private group
hierarchy
φuPRG : PRG(u)→ PRG(u) ∪ {⊥}
is a function defining the parent-child relationship among the
private groups of u.
Such private groups are strictly private to the creator of the
circle, and thus unknown to the users who are categorized.
Private groups provide a tool to control the flow of an
individual’s messages in a fine-grained manner (akin to the use
of circles in Google+), for example specifying that a message
is visible only to the user categorized to a specific private
circle.
As a concrete example, consider a physician working on
a very sensitive case. She/he may create a private group of
“untrusted colleagues” to avoid such users from receiving
messages pertaining that sensitive case exchanged within the
remaining members of the department.
Beside information flow, ASNs require a way to manage
the privileges of their members. In the following we define as
privileges the operations that a user is allowed to perform in a
ASN. To do that PriSM uses an approach similar to [2]. PriSM
uses the roles assigned to user by the ASN administrator.
In the presented model a role is a job function/title within
the organization with some associated semantics regarding the
authority and responsibility conferred on a member role.
Definition 2.10 (Role): Given an autonomous social net-
work asn ∈ ASN , a role r ∈ R(asn) is a couple of the
form
〈n,PR〉
where n is the (unique) identifier of the role and PR is the
set of privileges granted and/or denied to the members of the
role r.
As for groups, role may be organized hierarchically.
Definition 2.11 (Role hierarchy): Let R be a set of roles
defined for an autonomous social network asn. A role hierar-
chy
φR : R → R∪ {⊥}
is the function which defines the child-parent relationship
among the roles.
A user may be associated with multiple roles, according
to the functions she/he is performing within the organization.
Furthermore, PriSM allows the administrator to further refine
the privileges available to a given user according to “where”
(in which context) she/he is operating. In fact the privileges
granted to a given user at a given moment are defined com-
bining the roles to which the user has been assigned and the
subdomain in which she/he is operating. Thus, the subdomains
contribute to identify the available privileges, refining the
privileges of a role (both granting or revoking privileges) or
even granting/revoking permissions directly to specific users.
Beside that, a group creator may wish to restrict the mem-
bership to the group, for example not granting the membership
to those users who are member of another specific group.
Moreover, one may need to moderate the messages associated
with a given group. PriSM provides to the users the possibility
to specify group privileges (to be elaborated in Section IV).
Finally, we have all the concepts required to formally define
circles.
Definition 2.12 (Circle): Given a social mesh SM , the set
of circles C is defined as follows:
C = PG(SM)
⋃
asn∈ASN (SM)
SD(asn)
⋃
u∈U(SM)
PRG(u)
To wrap up, we define “a message”, which is the entity of
data created by and shared among the users of the social mesh.
Definition 2.13 (Message): A message m is a tuple
〈u, t, T , I〉 where u ∈ U is the author of the message, t is
the content. T , I ⊆ C(u) are respectively called the tag and
the conflict set.
III. FRONTIER INFORMATION PROPAGATION MECHANISM
It is fairly complex to manage the communication within
large organizations. In particular, sometimes it is not com-
pletely clear who are the users entitled to access certain
information. The complexity increases rapidly when dealing
with the communication between users belonging to different
organizations. In the following, we will present a mechanism
to handle such complexity, by taking advantage of the model
defined in Section II. In our model, information propagation
is performed with respect to circles but not to domains since
domains deal with privileges of users, while circles have been
specifically designed to deal with information flow.
The Frontier Information Propagation Mechanism ensures
that a given message m is accessible by all the users who are
member of at least a circle in T (m) but who are not member
of any circle in I(m). In addition, other users may read the
message m satisfying
the policies of at least a circle c ∈ T (m). Moreover, it is
also possible for a user to access m if there exists a sequence
of circles CSeq = c1, . . . , cn where cn ∈ T (m) and ∀i ∈
[2, n], φ(ci) = ci−1. The user u is allowed to access m if and
only if she/he satisfies the policies defined for all the circles
in CSeq.
The syntax to describe the policies is outside the scope of
this work and treated in works such as [3].
Informally, policies are of the form:
a← pred1 ∧ . . . ∧ predk
where a ∈ {allow,deny} and each predicate predi verifies
properties of the message, the author of the message or the
user reading the message. The properties verified by the predi-
cates currently supported by PriSMcomprehend: author/reader
identity, author/reader membership, tags of the message, etc.
The enforcement mechanism is described in Alg. 1.
Input: m, the message to be accessed, u the reader of
the message
begin
for c ∈ I(m) do
if u ∈M(c) then
return deny;
for c ∈ T (m) do
c′ := c;
while c′ 6= ⊥ do
if u ∈M(c′) then
return allow;
else
if verifies(u, P(c′)) then
c′ := φ(c′);
return deny;
Algorithm 1: The Frontier Information Propagation Mecha-
nism.
Consider an example scenario shown in Figure 2. In such
a scenario, the users Bob, Charlie and Ellen are following
Alice. Alice is member of the circle C1 which is in turn an
inner circle of C2. Suppose Alice creates a message m such
that T (m) = {C1} and that I(m) = ∅. As previously defined,
the Frontier Information Propagation mechanism states that if
∃c ∈ T (m) such that reader ∈M(c) then reader is allowed
to access the message. Thus Bob is allowed to access m since
he is a member of C1. On the other hand the other users
will satisfy the policies of C1 to access m. Assuming that
both Charlie and Elen satisfy such policies, only Charlie will
access m because he is a member of C2. Hence, Elen will be
required to satisfy also the policies of C2 before being able to
read content from the circle C2.
If the collision set I(m) is not empty, then it needs to be
verified whether the reader is member of any of the circles in
such a set. If this is the case, then the reader is not allowed
to access m.
Fig. 2: An example for the frontier information propagation
mechanism.
IV. MANAGEMENT OF PRIVILEGES
PriSM supports what we call group and domain privileges.
The former are those privileges which define the actions
users can perform within a group, such as the privileges of
joining the group, to tag a message with the current group
or the requirement of the messages tagged with a group to
be moderated by a boss of the group. The latter are those
privileges granting to users administrative powers, such as the
privileges to create public circles, to create subdomains, to
create roles and so on and so forth.
Group privileges are specific for the group in which they
are defined and therefore their enforcement is straightforward:
once a user is operating in a specific group, the group
privileges are enforced.
In contrast, domain privileges require a more complex
mechanism to be enforced. Note that the PriSM framework
manages and enforces access control at ASN’s level, in the
sense that the domain privileges are defined in groups char-
acteristics of a ASN – such are roles and subdomains – and
they can be enforced only within the specific ASN.
As presented in Section II, the operations a user is granted
to perform are defined by a combination of her/his roles
and the subdomain in which she/he is operating. Because of
that, the PriSM framework enforces access control differently
according to the action performed by the user.
The enforcement algorithm works as follows (also see
Figure 3). Let us assume a given ASN asn and the user u ∈
U(asn) who is associated with the roles r1, . . . , rn ∈ R(asd).
Thus, u is granted the privileges uPR =
⋃n
i=1 PR(ri). When
u operates within a subdomain sd ∈ SD(asn) the privileges
actually granted to u are computed as:
uPR ⊗ PR(sd)
Recall that the predicate ⊗ refines the privileges in uPR
with the ones defined in PR(sd).
Fig. 3: Access control model.
V. PRISM ARCHITECTURE
In order to provide the services required by an ASN,
each domain deploys PriSM locally. Figure 4 shows the
architecture of an independent ASN deployment comprising
several interconnected modules. Each module is in charge of
managing a specific subset of the features provided by the
system. Many of these features are ‘standard’ in any state-of-
the-art online social network platform while a few others are
novel, specific to PriSM’s distributed/federated nature and its
access and information flow controls:
• User Manager: This module provides an interface to the
operations directly related to the users, such as registra-
tion, profile management, relations and subscription of
messages from other users, etc.
• Circle Manager: This component controls the circles
related information such as the lists of members and
the propagation policies for each circle other than any
relationships between them (See Definition 2.4 and Def-
inition 2.9).
• Access Control Manager: This module regulates both
the actions performed by the users of a PriSM ASN with
respect to the privileges assigned to them by the domains
administrators and enforces the policies defined in the
circles (the later is elaborated in Section V-A).
The functionalities of this module are: (i) to store and
propagate the messages (and content) generated by the
ASN’s users and (ii) to grant access only to those users
who are allowed according to the rules.
The PriSM Web Interface exposes the services orchestrated by
all these constituent modules to the ASN users.
A final module manages the interconnections between the
different ASN instances of PriSM.
• Remote Interface: This module is in charge of perform-
ing the operations of exchanging information with other
ASNs. For example, the Remote Interface retrieves the
required data when a user is accessing the profile of
some user u′ in some other domain D′. It also sends to
the interested domains the updates involving shared data,
such as those regarding the members and/or the policies
of shared circles.
The present PriSM implementation allows communica-
tion between only ASNs which have been manually
paired by the domains’ administrators. Paired ASNs are
considered trusted in the current model. Additionally, at
present we assume the existence of a service to correctly
discover other ASNs and their trustworthiness. These
assumptions need further consideration in future. We will
also like to remark that individual ASN deployments are
free to tweak the constituent modules, to add or modify
functionalities as deemed appropriate.
Fig. 4: PriSM ASN architecture.
A. Message propagation
The primary objective of the PriSM system is to allow
users to exchange information. In order to provide the users
a satisfactory experience, the architecture of PriSM has been
designed to reduce the time elapsing between when the infor-
mation is created and when it is actually available to the final
user.
Figure 5 shows the steps required to post a message through
the system to all the users potentially interested in it.
First of all the user u sends the message m to the Content
Manager (1), which stores the message in the local database.
Afterwards, the Content Manager retrieves the set of followers
Fˆ = {u1, . . . , uk} from the User Manager (2). The Content
Manager requests to the Access Control Manager for each
local user ui ∈ L ⊆ Fˆ , if ui is allowed to access m (3). The
verification is performed by Access Control Manager accord-
ing to both the tag set, the conflict set (see Definition 2.13),
the set of circles to which u′i is member of and the list of
propagation polices. Such information are retrieved by the
Access Control Manager querying the Circle Manager (4).
If the verification (3) holds then the Content Manager will
notify the user ui, immediately if the user is currently online
or delivered in the user’s ‘inbox’ to be retrieved as soon as
she/he logs into the system (9). At the same time, the Content
Manager sends the set of remote users RU = Fˆ \ L to the
Remote Interface (6) which will, in turn, extract the set of
domains RD = {d1, . . . , dq}, with q ≤ |RU|, to be notified
of the existence of m (6).
The action of notifying the remote domains actually consists
in forwarding m. Therefore, each remote domain rd ∈ RD
will send the message m to the local Content Manager (8)
which, in turn, will perform the steps (2) to (4), as performed
by the Content Manager of the original domain, including the
final notification (9) to the users local to rd.
We assume each domain to be trusted. It means that the
Access Control Manager will behave consistently across all
ASNs. Moreover, we assume that circles’ data and messages
will be replicated among different domains, mainly to reduce
the latency of the system. Note that such an assumptions do not
introduce any vulnerability substantially different than while
using other modes of electronic communication such as email.
Fig. 5: How to post/retrieve a message in PriSM.
B. Implementation of the framework
The model described in Section II and the architecture
previously presented have been implemented in a prototype
using Java 6 and GWT [4] for the user interface. A MySQL [5]
database is used for the persistency of the data. The communi-
cation protocol between the different deployed ASN instances
occurs using a well defined REST interface [6].
The current prototype is structured as a modular server, in
which each component is directly connected with the others
as shown in Figure 4. Nevertheless, the server modules can
be easily separated on different machines, to take advantage
of such parallelism.
A final remark we will like to make, to repeat what has
been stated elsewhere, is that the individual modules can be
modified, or additional modules added, as deemed essential for
an ASN instance. Furthermore, we are working on exposing a
set of interfaces so that other “apps” can be deployed on top
of PriSM by leveraging on its existing functionalities.
C. Evaluation and discussion of the architecture
From our observations, the PriSM architecture presents
mainly three possible scalability bottlenecks (i) the Web
Interface (ii) the Remote Interface and (iii) the database.
More precisely, increasing the number of the users of a ASN
increases the probability of users connected simultaneously to
the system. Such a condition will require an ever increasing
amount of computational resources. Similarly, more resources
are required to provide the same promptness of the system
with the increase of the number of interconnected ASNs.
The three previously mentioned issues can be addressed us-
ing standard distributed systems techniques, such as replicating
the appropriate modules of the architecture.
Each module of the PriSM’s architecture is stateless,3 and
internally highly parallelized, specifically with the intent to
simplify its replication. Similarly, the database can be repli-
cated and distributed as well. However, such operation will
have a cost in terms of an increased complexity to manage
the consistency of the data.
We benchmarked the performances of the remote operations
to empirically verify the scalability of the proposed architec-
ture. We evaluated the execution time of each remote operation
varying the number of involved ASNs. The experiments have
been executed in a network of two computers (Linux 3.0.1
running on a Intel Core 2 Duo 2.53GHz with 4GB of RAM).
On the first machine we ran the PriSM prototype, while on
the other machine ran a ‘light weight’ version, which did not
provide the Web Interface. The results are shown in Figure 6.
As one may notice, the time required for the execution of
each operation is negligible except for sending messages to
the remote ASNs – the Post operation. We observed that
PriSM prototype requires on an average 8780 milliseconds
to propagate a message to 250 distinct ASNs. Note that,
normally an individual has 100s of contacts. Thus, even if
each of these contacts were to belong to a different ASN, the
delays introduced for scaling the message propagation over
very many ASNS is reasonable, showcasing the scalability of
our PriSM implementation.
Fig. 6: Empirical evaluation of the architecture’s scalability,
the y-axis uses a logarithmic scale.
Given the result of the previous experiments, we also
evaluated the scalability of the software itself. This was done
by evaluating the capacity level of a single PriSM instance.
Thus, we measured the number of operations per second that
a PriSM instance is able to handle under different stress
levels. In this experiment we executed only the Post operations
because, as we previously showed, it is the most expensive in
term of resources required. To create different load levels we
set as a parameter the number of parallel clients (from 50
to 300). Figure 7 shows the results. Our first implementation
was not really able to scale that well (see the HouseMade
series in Figure 7). In fact we obtained several database-
related error messages when we hit the prototype with 150
3See [7] for a more formal and complete definition of stateless
clients. Initially we imagined that the errors were caused by
bad performances of our house-made connection pool. Hence,
we changed to the one provided by Apache Tomcat. The
results using the default configuration were even worse (see
the ConnectionPool series). We changed then the configuration
increasing the minimum number of pooled connections (from
100 to 300) and the results increased (ConnectionPool(300)
in the graph) but not as much as we expected. Finally, we
realized that the bottleneck was caused by the configuration
of the database server instead of the connection pool. This
was caused mainly by the fact that the messages generated by
MySQL are fairly cryptic.
Hence, we extended the log mechanism of PriSM to better
observe the usage of the connection pool and of the various
connections. The primary outcome was a better understanding
of the errors. MySQL is by default configured to handle
100 parallel connections through the network. Increasing such
value to 1000 partially improved the performances because the
machine’s operating system (Linux Ubuntu 12.04) has a fairly
long TIME-WAIT for actually closing connections (see [8]).
Once we modified the corresponding configuration, both
increasing the number of parallel connection and setting the
configuration of the OS to reuse connections in TIME-WAIT
state, we were able to measure the real capacity of the system
(as shown in Figure 7, ConnectionPool(1000) ).
Fig. 7: Number of varying the number of requesting users,
with the 10th and 90th percentile.
Furthermore, we evaluated the time taken to post a message
to different ASNs. To do that, we took advantage of a real
cloud provider. Namely, we rented 5 EC2[9] instances in
5 different datacenters across the globe (see Table I). All
the instances have the same (virtual) hardware configuration:
m1.large, 7.5 GiB memory, 4 EC2 Compute Units (2 virtual
cores with 2 EC2 Compute Units each), 850 GB instance
storage, 64-bit platform. We configured the virtual machines to
run Ubuntu 12.04 LTS and we installed on them the strictly
required software (OpenJDK 7, Apache Tomcat 7, MySQL
5.1). The experiments run as follows: we simulated that a user
posed a message in the Singaporean ASN and we measured
the time required to the message to reach all the other ASNs.
Name Location Avg ping
asia_sg Asia Pacific (Singapore) 0ms
eu_west Europe (Ireland) 550ms
s_america South America (Brazil) 737ms
us_east US East (N. Virginia) 526ms
us_west US West (Oregon) 445ms
TABLE I: Characteristics of the EC2 instances.
The parameter for these series of experiment was the
number of threads handling the delivery of the messages.
The results of each experiment are shown in Figure 8a,
Figure 8b, Figure 8c and Figure 8d respectively. As we
expected increasing the number of working threads decreased
the time required to deliver the messages to remote sites.
We also benchmarked the time required for a user to access
a given message. In particular we evaluated two aspects: the
length of the sequence of circles that the reader has to cross in
order to access a message (see Section III) and the number of
rules to be evaluated to access messages of a given circle. In
both scenarios we assume a ASN with 100 circles hierarchi-
cally organized and a user u who wants to access a message
m. u is member of 50 random circles and T (m) contains 10
(random) circles c1, . . . , c10 with ∀i ∈ [1, 10], u 6∈ M(ci).
We also define 10 rules composed by 10 random predicates
for each circle. As shown in Figure 9, the time required for
u to access the message m is linear to the length of the
sequence of circles separating u from m. We observed that on
an average 115 milliseconds were required to access a message
tagged with the last circle of a sequence of 50 circles. We
also observed that the number of tags associated with m has a
lesser impact on the performances. The main reason is because
the evaluation of the different possible sequences of circles is
performed in parallel and, more importantly, distinct sequences
are merged if during their evaluations common circles are
found.
In the second series of experiments, we investigate another
aspect, that of the time required by a user u to access messages
contained in a given circle c, with u 6∈ M(c) and φ(c) =
⊥ (see Section II). As expected, the time required is linear
with the number of rules associated with c. We observed that
on an average 187 microseconds were required to evaluate
1000 rules. The results are shown in Figure 10. Based on
observations, the jitter trend in Figure 10 is caused by the
memory allocation of the JVM and noises from background
processes running on the testing machine.
VI. RELATED WORKS
In the current section we briefly discuss some works related
to the proposed framework.
Decentralized Social Network. There has been recent
interests in deploying decentralized online social networking
(DOSN) as an alternative to the centralized third party services
such as Facebook in order to avoid big brotherly controls
and monitoring. Different architectures have been proposed by
open-source as well as academic communities, which include
Fig. 9: Time required to access a message with respect to the
number of circles in the sequence; the error bar represents the
10th and the 90th percentiles.
Fig. 10: Time required to access a message with respect to
the number of rules; the error bar represents the 10th and the
90th percentiles.
Diaspora [10], Appleseed [11], Vis-a`-Vis [12], SuperNova [13]
among others [14]. Traditional anonymous communication and
file sharing networks such as Freenet [15] have also been
adapted to support friend-to-friend darknet subnetworks. A
more detailed survey on DOSNs can be found at [16]. The
main motivation of these works is privacy, anonymity and
free-speech of individuals. The deployment models are pre-
dominantly peer-to-peer in nature, where most (all) individual
participants contribute resources to the system and control
their individual data, and hence the infrastructure provides best
effort service, and the design focus are towards dealing with
system churn, fairness & incentives, etc.
Federated Social Network. Another criticism of central-
ized social networks like Facebook and LinkedIn is that users
are tied-in, and cannot communicate across networks. Social
network interoperability has been advocated to address such
barriers [17], [18] for users to communicate across social
networks and achieve portability. In achieving federation of
such social networks, the main challenge is to specify data
format and protocol for exchanging information across differ-
ent platforms - dealing with both technical issues (originating
from the different existing implementations) and legal and
commercial issues (e.g., companies are unwilling to expose
user data to competitors).
PriSM is instead designed for deployment in workplaces,
and works with similar assumptions of trust as do organiza-
(a) 1 thread (b) 2 threads
(c) 3 threads (d) 4 threads
Fig. 8: Remote post execution time distribution with different number of threads.
tional email services. Specifically, in PriSM autonomous social
networks (ASN) are deployed and managed in a centralized
manner on well provisioned infrastructure. It gives its users
privacy privileges with respect to other fellow users, but
not necessarily from the organization whose infrastructure
the users are using. Instead, it is designed to provide the
organizations a means to manage their users’ interactions
flexibly and subject to the organizations’ security and con-
fidentiality needs. The goals of federation are also distinct,
in that the federation is among multiple ASN instances with
a common set of communication interfaces, but the objective
is to enable flexible specification and control of information
across ASNs, as determined by organizational business logic
and confidentiality needs. Cross-platform federation of PriSM
ASNs with other social networks will still need extrinsic
mechanisms [18].
Commercial alternatives. Oracle Social Network [19],
Yammer [20] and SalesForce [21] are a few commercial ser-
vices providing some analogous functionalities by facilitating
inter-department and inter-organization information exchange.
These services reside in third party cloud infrastructures, in
contrast to PriSM, which owing to its decentralized architec-
ture allows multiple deployment models, including third party
public cloud as well as fully controlled private cloud hosting.
Furthermore, PriSM allows customized mapping of organiza-
tional hierarchy & workflows and finer grained specification of
who is entitled to access certain information, a feature which
is lacking in the existing general purpose services.
Security and Privacy. OSNs and DOSNs are often crit-
icized for the currently provided protection mechanisms. To
overcome such restrictions several works has been done,
mainly focusing on protecting private and sensible information
while performing social network analysis (see [22], [23]). One
of the common characteristics of almost all the newly defined
access control models is that access control is relationship-
based [24], that is, authorized users are denoted on the basis
of constraints on the relationships the requester should have
with other network users and/or the trust level associated
with a relationship [25]. Following such trend, PriSM natively
supports an efficient relationship-based security mechanism
based on relationships specified by means of circles, mimicing
the security rules of work environments. Such mechanism can
be easily extended to include more advanced constraints like
the ones previously presented.
Access control. With respect to “pure” access control, the
most widespread family of access control model is RBAC
(Role-Based Access Control), proposed in [26] and in subse-
quent publications. PriSM provides management of privileges
as in [26], taking advantage of the role concept with the ob-
jective to simplify the management of the privileges assigned
to users. Our approach is also inspired by the works [27],
[2]. These works extend the RBAC model such that: the roles
define the actions that a user may perform while the “team”
defines the object on which such actions can be performed.
In PriSM, this idea has been further extended using teams
for refining the privileges associated to roles. Practically, in
PriSM it is possible for an administrator to create roles that
are more general than in a pure RBAC model, and therefore
fewer number of roles suffice. The context, defined by the
team, can be used both to identify the objects on which the
user is allowed to operate and to slightly change the privileges
of the role. As a result, PriSM provides a way to reduce the
increasing number of defined roles in order to identify the
right set of privileges for a given task. This is a common and
well known issue in systems deploying the RBAC model. To
balance that, PriSM allows the operational context, the team
or in our case the subdomain, to grant/revoke privileges when
required.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented PriSM, a framework for
peer-to-peer interactions among autonomous social networks.
The PriSM framework is supported by a formal model
defining relationships and interactions among the different
users. In particular the framework allows delegated declara-
tion/administration of (sub-)domains which allow the possibil-
ity to define inherited privileges and restrictions on individuals
and groups of users, and provides easy to form communication
groups for the members to interact among themselves subject
to the constraints. While PriSM facilitates confidentiality and
privacy aware communication across autonomous entities,
thus allowing organizations to retain ownership of data and
control the flow of information, it does not provide confi-
dentiality to individual users from the organization to which
an user belongs. Additional cryptographic techniques would
be necessary for the same. The modular architecture of our
implementation will allow such solutions to be plugged in.
The proposed framework (and the prototype implemen-
tation) provides a flexible solution for the deployment of
collaborative network in different application scenarios. These
include (1) health sector, where different kinds of entities and
interactions are involved - such as internal communication
within and across hospitals, supply chain management with
pharmaceutical companies as well as public relations, out-
reach and patient support groups, (2) customer relationship
management and enterprise resource planning for private and
public companies allowing collaboration for the fulfillment of
joint operations but still ensuring that the exchanged informa-
tion abide management policies, (3) educational environment
complementing existing e-learning tools for better intra/inter-
institute communication, (4) local/city-level administration,
etc. We are at the moment engaged in exploratory discussions
with stake-holders from several of these application scenarios
to customize and deploy PriSM instances.
As part of future work, we aim to define a user API allowing
the deploying organizations to create personalized extensions
to the framework, taking advantage of all the features of the
communication infrastructure.
Finally, we also intend to formally define and verify the
frontier information propagation mechanism, with respect to
both the policy definition language and the corresponding
enforcing protocols.
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